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1 The primacy of acquaintance
Coliva and Belleri write:
[An] aspect of Recanati’s proposal that is not entirely clear is its precise 
scope. For we are told that mental files are mental indexicals which 
depend, for their existence, on there being an epistemically reward-
ing relation, in the form of acquaintance, between a subject and the 
object the file is a file of. On the face of it, however, this would entail 
that mental files are quite limited, for we do not seem to be acquainted 
with a lot of entities that we are nevertheless able to think about. We 
are not acquainted with non-existing and fictional entities; nor are we 
acquainted with past or future entities, let alone with abstract ones, 
like numbers or logical entities. (Coliva and Belleri, p. 2)
Coliva’s and Belleri’s observation raises a dilemma for my view: ei-
ther its scope is very limited, as they suggest — it only accounts for a 
small class of mental files based on acquaintance; or – if the account 
is taken to apply to all mental files, including those that are purely 
descriptive because there is no way in which we could be acquainted 
with the object they are about — then it is totally implausible.
Clearly, I offer my theory as a general account of singular thought; 
so its scope should not be limited to a small sub-class. This means 
that I have to embrace the second horn of the dilemma and face the 
implausibility criticism. As Keith Hall puts it,
Instances of mental files (…) whose function is ostensibly not charac-
terizable in terms of acquaintance are neither exotic nor rare: on the 
contrary, they pervade our cognitive lives. At the very least, the pro-
liferation of such problem-cases should make us question the motiva-
tion for taking the acquaintance-based function of files to be primary. 
(Hall, p. 11)
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This worry is especially pressing since there is no shortage of theo-
rists who reject the acquaintance constraint on singular thought. All 
the mental files ‘whose function is ostensibly not characterizable in 
terms of acquaintance’ lend prima facie support to their approach, 
as against mine. As a  result, ‘If Recanati is to maintain that the ac-
quaintance-based function of his mental files is somehow primary, he 
needs to offer more by way of argument for that claim’ (Hall, p. 11).
Let me start by rehearsing what I actually say in the book, in or-
der to make clear what I mean when I talk of the primacy of acquain-
tance. I say that mental files are governed by an acquaintance norm. 
Acquaintance is understood liberally, so that testimony counts as 
(mediated) acquaintance. Tokens of a given file carry the presupposi-
tion that the norm governing the file is satisfied: they carry an ac-
quaintance presupposition. The acquaintance presupposition gener-
ates what (in a two-dimensionalist framework) we may refer to as the 
primary content of the file token, distinct both from its referential 
or secondary content, and also from its informational content (the 
information in the file).
When the norm/presupposition is violated, the file fails to ex-
press a secondary content — it fails to refer —  but it still carries 
its primary content. So I can accept that, in such cases, the subject 
is still ‘thinking a singular thought’, in one sense of that phrase : a 
singular vehicle is tokened, which carries the primary content it in-
herits from the type of which it is a token. This accounts for the cases 
of de facto non-acquaintance, e.g. for the cases in which the subject 
is thinking about a nonexistent object such as Vulcan.
There is another type of case, in which there is no ‘failure’ prop-
erly speaking. There is no failure because the subject is not in the 
business of thinking about objects s/he is or might be acquainted 
with. Thinking about fictional characters like Emma Bovary is a case 
like that; thinking about the average American male, and calling him 
‘Bob’, may be another case of the same sort. All such cases are char-
acterized by the following two features: (i) there is no attempt to 
satisfy the norm, yet (ii) the norm remains operative. The norm re-
mains operative because it is ‘exploited’, to use Grice’s phrase. (Ac-
cording to Grice, the maxims of conversation are exploited when 
one flouts them blatantly in order to convey an implicature.) What 
the subject is doing with the file in the relevant cases is not governed 
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by the norm — so the subject can’t be criticized for violating the 
norm — but doing what he or she does still presupposes the norm. The 
subject could not do what s/he is doing with the file if the norm 
wasn’t in place. I will henceforth use ‘exploitation’ as a technical 
term to refer to the cases in which these conditions are satisfied.
The most general exploitation mechanism is simulation: one does 
as if one were using the file normally (i.e. according to the norm) to 
refer to an object of acquaintance. According to a simple and pow-
erful story, this is how fiction works (Lewis 1978, Walton 1990, 
Kripke 2013): it involves the simulation of (perceptual or testimo-
nial) acquaintance. It is pretty clear that simulation is parasitic on 
what is simulated, so condition (ii) is satisfied: doing as if one were 
following the norm presupposes the existence of the norm.
What should we say about the (secondary) content of the file in 
exploitation cases? Does the Emma Bovary file activated in the read-
er of Madame Bovary refer? The answer ought to be negative: there is 
simulated reference, but no actual reference. To be sure, there is a 
clear difference with the Vulcan case. In the Vulcan case the subject 
(Leverrier) makes a mistake and fails to think something true or 
false. In the Emma Bovary case, the reader makes no mistake and 
cannot be criticized. But the reason for that is that his or her thought 
occurs in a special, fictional mode. It does not matter that the files 
deployed by the reader of a fictional text fail to refer. As Frege sug-
gested, in fiction the step from sense to reference is not taken. In my 
framework, that means that the primary content is sufficient — one 
does not care about the secondary content, so it does not matter if 
there is no secondary content for the fictional thought. Still, accord-
ing to Frege, what the subject is thinking is neither true nor false.
What about descriptive names? Here also the thinker (the per-
son who uses or understands the descriptive name) is not acquainted 
with the object — the object is given only by description; and here 
also, the thinker cannot be criticized for not being acquainted with 
the object. This suggests that, perhaps, there is a form of simulation 
in this type of case as well. That’s the sort of story I floated in Direct 
Reference. In using descriptive names, arguably, we do as if the object 
was given (and use a singular vehicle to think about  it). Why do we 
do that? In many cases (those I focussed on in Direct Reference) because 
we anticipate a forthcoming epistemic state in which we will be ac-
quainted with the reference. In other cases, there may be no such 
anticipation, but using a singular vehicle may yield worthwile cogni-
tive dividends, by making thinking and reasoning easier (especially 
when counterfactual thinking/reasoning is involved).
If we opt for a simulationist approach to descriptive names, we 
can maintain Evans’s hard line regarding their secondary or  refer-
ential content. The strong acquaintance view, as I call Evans’s posi-
tion, says that the singular thought we attempt to think (about the 
object known by description) is not available for us to think. (This 
is reminiscent of what Russell says about ‘Bismarck’.) The thought 
fails to have a singular content, though phenomenologically it feels as 
if it had a singular content. But tokening the thought vehicle in the 
simulative mode brings cognitive dividends which compensate for 
the local ‘lapse into fiction’ induced by descriptive names.
The strong acquaintance view is not the only possible take on 
descriptive names, even within a simulationist framework. (As I said 
already, I take the ‘anticipated acquaintance’ account of descriptive 
names put forward in Direct Reference to be a form of simulationism. 
To anticipate an acquaintance situation is to do as if it already ob-
tained.) We can also liberalize the acquaintance constraint and say 
that when we correctly anticipate some forthcoming acquaintance re-
lation to the denotation of the description, then we are in a posi-
tion to think a genuine singular thought about it. This view (which 
Hall calls ‘Loophole’) is put forward very tentatively in Mental Files. 
I don’t endorse it in the book — I mention it as an intermediate po-
sition (worth investigating) between the strong acquaintance view 
and liberalism. Hall and Coliva & Belleri don’t like this intermedi-
ate view, which seems to posit a weird kind of backward causation. 
Moreover, Coliva and Belleri point out that it does not fit my picture 
very well, because the relation to the future referent is not epistemi-
cally rewarding. In any case, I don’t really care whether Loophole is 
true or not. I can live with the strong acquaintance view, as I can live 
with the liberal view put forward by advocates of semantic instru-
mentalism.
Radical forms of semantic instrumentalism, such as that put for-
ward by David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), provide an alternative to sim-
ulation approaches. According to radical instrumentalism, using sin-
gular vehicles when the referent is known only by description yields 
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a ‘broadening of the horizon of thought’: a singular thought content 
which, without language, would not available to the subject (because 
the acquaintance constraint is not satisfied) becomes available when 
we help ourselves to the linguistic apparatus of direct reference. On 
this view the thinker actually manages to refer singularly, so what 
may have started as a form of simulation has led to a form of ‘cogni-
tive restructuring’: the acquaintance constraint is no longer opera-
tive and we can think singularly about objects through essentially 
linguistic means. This is very different from the strong acquaintance 
view, because the thought is now taken to have a full blown second-
ary content which is singular. If we follow this route we embrace a 
strong form of liberalism. We reach the conclusion that ‘any act of 
descriptive reference-fixing would allow subjects to entertain singu-
lar contents without acquaintance’ (Hall, p. 7).
Hall thinks this liberal position is not open to me:
Although that conclusion would be welcome to me, this is precisely the 
sort of liberal view Recanati wishes to avoid. For this reason, I do not 
think that Recanati’s semi-liberal position here is sustainable. (Hall, 
p. 7)
By ‘Recanati’s semi-liberal position’ Hall refers to the view that, al-
though the acquaintance constraint holds, it is satisfied when we cor-
rectly anticipate a future acquaintance relation (Loophole). Now, as 
I said already, I don’t really care about Loophole’s fate. And I have 
no quarrel with semantic instrumentalism. I can accept the liberal 
view that some files are not governed by an acquaintance constraint. 
Appareances notwithstanding, the liberal view is compatible with 
my account for, in addition to mechanisms of exploitation, which 
presuppose the acquaintance norm, I also make room for derived func-
tions for singular vehicles. When a singular vehicle acquires a derived 
function, the norm corresponding to the initial function no longer 
holds. So I am open to the instrumentalist suggestion that language 
‘broadens the horizons of thought’ and makes it possible to use our 
mental files to do something other than what it is the primary func-
tion of the files to do.
‘Primary’ here must be understood in a new, evolutionary sense. 
The idea is this. We start with referential devices which are already 
in place in perception (as well as in infant cognition). These devices 
are encoded in language, but language makes it possible to do things 
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with them that we can’t do in perception (or that infants can’t do). 
For example, in language referential indices can be bound (through 
quantifiers which manipulate assignment functions instead of letting 
the context assign referents to the indices), and they can also be used 
freely, without external anchoring, as in E-type anaphora or the at-
tributive use of descriptions. I accept that there are these things in 
language (and in thought informed by language). So I am open to 
the idea that there are ???????????????????????, as people as diverse as 
Jeshion, Dickie and Cumming have recently claimed. That’s compat-
ible with my framework if one treats such descriptive files as a late 
achievement made possible by language.
Hall objects to my view that
even if the acquaintance-based function of files is somehow evolution-
arily basic, I see no compelling reason to think that the functions of 
files should not have evolved from their original acquaintance-based 
function. (Hall, p. 11n)
But that’s exactly what I am saying. The cases which are the most 
striking counterexamples to the acquaintance view, namely the cases 
in which there is not even exploitation of the acquaintance norm but, rath-
er, a different use of the file altogether, are cases in which the file has 
evolved derived functions, distinct from the evolutionary basic func-
tion of storing information gained through acquaintance. I accept 
that there are such cases, but I maintain that acquaintance has got 
some sort of primacy. I am making an empirical hypothesis : that the 
object tracking system which exists in perception is used throughout 
cognition — even in high-level cognition, e.g. in thought about ab-
stract objects. The units of the system — the files — acquire new 
functions when they are recruited in this way to do extra jobs in 
thought. The hypothesis is that language plays a crucial role in mak-
ing these new functions available.
To sum up, there are three types of case to consider, and two 
senses in which the acquaintance function of files is primary. The 
three types of case are: (i) the prototypical cases in which a file is 
used to track an object one is acquainted with and to store informa-
tion gained through acquaintance with it; (ii) the exploitation cases 
in which e.g. one does as if the file was used to track an object of 
acquaintance and to store information about it (even though it’s not); 
and (iii) the cases in which the acquaintance norm is no longer op-
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erative because the files have evolved derived functions. The two 
senses of ‘primary’ are: (a) in exploitation cases the acquaintance 
norm which governs the type is presupposed, even though the think-
er is not following the norm but engaging in simulation. Simulation 
is asymetrically dependent on what is simulated, and that is what es-
tablishes the primacy of the prototypical acquaintance cases over the 
simulation cases. (b) The derived functions correspond to new jobs 
assigned to the files, but the referential function of the prototypical 
files is primary because ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the object tracking system (where they have a referential function), and 
the new roles correspond to uses of ?????????? to do new things thanks 
to, inter alia, the interaction with the linguistic system.
2 Vehicles, modes of presentation, and primary content
Some of my critics are puzzled by my oscillation between talk of files 
as quasi-syntactic vehicles and talk of files as modes of presentation:
There seem to be (…) ambiguities in the way mental files are present-
ed. On the one hand, we are told that they are singular Fregean senses, 
that determine the referents they stand for. On the other, we are told 
that they are similar to Fodor’s terms in the language of thought. How-
ever, Fodor’s concepts are only syntactically different and do not con-
tain any semantically relevant material apart from their referent, nor is 
the latter determined by sense. (Coliva and Belleri, p. 2)
Mental files are the vehicles of singular thoughts. They belong 
to the system of mental representations. They are the mental 
counterparts to singular terms, and they refer, or are supposed 
to refer. (…) At the same time, they are modes of presentation, 
which is to say “senses” (p. 257), and individual concepts, i.e. 
thought constituents (p. 64). For someone used to thinking 
about language, this is puzzling. (Pagin, p. 3)
But there is no puzzle, really. Modes of presentation are whatev-
er plays the mode-of-presentation-role (as defined through what 
Schiffer refers to as ‘Frege’s Constraint’).1 Beyond that, it is an open 
issue what exactly modes of presentation are — what plays the role. 
My claim in the book is that what plays the mode of presentation role 
is the vehicle (the file). By this I mean that it is possible for a rational 
1 See Schiffer 1978 : 180
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subject to take different attitudes towards (what is in fact) the same 
object if the subject has two numerically distinct files about that ob-
ject. The files don’t have to differ semantically: they may be of the 
same type, have the same referent, and contain the same information 
(or misinformation).
Pagin describes a Fregean semantics for mental files as based on 
the following principle:
(DIF) Any difference in cognitive significance between two men-
tal files can be explained by their semantic difference.
Pagin thinks I accept the principle, but I don’t. I reject (DIF). Pagin 
himself, in the paper, shows that a mental file theorist is not in a posi-
tion to embrace (DIF). He gives the following example:
Suppose X takes herself to see two moths flying around in her 
kitchen. She opens a file for each, alpha and beta, thinking of 
them as “A” and “B”, respectively. She takes herself to see now 
A, now B. The acquaintance relations are indeed different in 
case there are two moths, one causing the opening of alpha, 
the other the opening of beta. But in case the subject in fact 
is mistaken, and there is only one moth causing the opening of 
both files, there does not seem to be any difference between 
the acquaintance relations of alpha and beta. (…)
Such a situation is certainly possible (and so are others, es-
sentially like it). Is there any semantic difference between 
the files alpha and beta? A description theorist can certainly 
say that the terms ‘A’ and ‘B’ differ in sense: the one can have 
the sense of the description ‘the moth I saw first’ and the other 
the same sense as ‘the moth I saw second’, even if she coined 
the terms only after taking herself to have seen both and did 
not then remember the original sightings. (…)  But this op-
tion is not open to the mental file theorist, since for both files 
there is an acquaintance relation to an object, in fact the same 
object, and there does not seem to be any difference between 
these relations except the distinctness of the mental file relata. 
(Pagin, p. 7)
In the case described by Pagin, there is no semantic difference be-
tween the two files, which are exactly alike. Yet in that situation the 
subject can contemplate the possibility that alpha is F while beta is 
not F. What this shows is that two files can differ in cognitive sig-
nificance solo numero. So we should reject (DIF). That is what I mean 
when I say that modes of presentation are vehicles.
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This does not mean that only the numerical identity of the file 
qua mental particular matters to cognitive significance; that would 
be absurd. My claim is weaker: nothing less fine-grained that the 
vehicle, and in particular no semantically defined equivalence class, 
will  be able to play the mode of presentation role in its entirety. We 
need mental particulars (as Perry often emphasized). But the vehicles 
have semantic properties, and among their semantic properties some 
contribute in a non-negligible way to cognitive significance. In par-
ticular, the type of a file carries a presupposition to the effect that a 
certain type of ER relation is in place. The presuppositions carried 
by a file in virtue of its type constitute its primary content.
Coliva and Belleri complain that, if files are vehicles, the theory 
fails to account semantically for what is common to singular thoughts 
when the acquaintance constraint is satisfied and when it isn’t. What 
is common, in my framework, is only a singular vehicle. In the nor-
mal case, when the acquaintance constraint is satisfied, the vehicle 
has a singular content, but when the acquaintance constraint is not 
satisfied, a singular vehicle is tokened but it does not have a proper 
singular content. This is unsatisfactory, Coliva and Belleri say:
Recanati describes subjects who entertain such files as thinking singu-
lar vehicles and not singular contents. To entertain a singular vehicle, 
he says, is to token a mental file which is not created on the basis of an 
acquaintance relation (either one that actually obtains, or one which is 
expected to actually obtain) (166-169). Singular vehicles however, are 
merely taken to provide singular reference by those who entertain them 
(if, e.g., they are mistaken about the existence of their referent—think 
of a child who believes in Santa Claus); at best, they are treated as pro-
viding singular reference (we may imagine a cautious scientist, who is 
not sure about the existence of the entity she is naming). In each case, 
theirs is only an appearance of singularity and it is not clear how one 
could go from an appearance of singular thought to singular thought 
proper, in any interesting semantic sense. So if entertaining a singular 
vehicle comes down to entertaining a seemingly singular thought (which 
is really not a singular thought, in any interesting semantic sense), we 
do not see how this notion could be of help. (Coliva and Belleri, p. 2-3)
To sum up their argument: in a framework which takes the files to be 
syntactic entities, there will be no notion of singular thought charac-
terizable ‘in any interesting semantic sense’.
But I deny that. There is an interesting semantic sense in which 
to entertain a singular vehicle is to think a singular thought. The 
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singular vehicle has a primary content, which it retains even when 
there is failure of reference (hence no secondary content). That is 
sufficient to ease Coliva’s and Belleri’s worry. The primary content 
corresponds to the fact that (even if the acquaintance constraint is 
not satisfied) the subject entertaining the file is supposed to stand in 
the right ER relation to the object s/he purports to think about. The 
primary content has a normative character and survives when, de 
facto, the norm is not complied with.
Pagin objects to the idea that files have primary content in that 
sense:
The concept of a mental file, like the concept of a gene in ge-
netics, is in itself functional. Unlike linguistic expressions, 
we don’t observe mental files or tokenings of them. We can-
not demonstrate them. What we know about mental files, we 
know on the basis of the theory of mental files. ‘Mental file’ is a 
theoretical term in a theory like Recanati’s, and the interpret-
ed theory formulation it occurs in gives us its functional role, 
which is our concept of a mental file. We can then go on to 
ask whether there exist mental entities that fill this role, and 
whether there is a unique collection of entities that do. (…)
In classical functional role theory (e.g. Loar 1986), the func-
tional roles are causal. This means that we can investigate the 
causal pattern in e.g. processes of the brain, to find out what 
brain states fulfill certain functional roles. But when the func-
tional role is normative, this cannot be done. We cannot, as a 
means of identifying mental files, get hold of a brain state, or 
a mental state, and ask whether that state is required to have an 
acquaintance relation to an object. A brain state, or a mental 
state, can at most be subject to such a requirement once it has 
been identified as a mental file by an independent criterion. 
For instance, if mental files were all causally related to external 
objects by some acquaintance relation, we could use that gen-
eral fact to identify mental files. But this is not the case, on 
Recanati’s account. It is only part of their function to be required 
to stand in an acquaintance relation. But that means conflating 
a consequence of being a mental file with what is needed for 
identifying them in the first place. That is why I find the idea of 
the primary content of mental files problematic. (Pagin, p. 9)
Pagin says the problematic step ‘comes when an additional func-
tional role or normative requirement is included in the basic 
functional role itself’ (p. 9). But if this is the problem, then 
let’s not include the normative requirement in the basic 
François Recanati10
functional role. Let’s start with the set of basic cases, i.e. 
the cases in which all goes well (the acquaintance relations 
are in place, etc.), and characterize the basic functional role 
of mental files at that level, as Pagin recommends. The as-
sumption is that there are things that play that role, and that 
we can find out what they are by looking. Suppose we have 
identified them. Then a further assumption of the theory is 
that it will be possible to find other things with the  following 
three properties:
(i) They are of the same type (nonsemantically characterized) as 
the basic files.
(ii) They don’t play the basic functional role because the acquain-
tance relations aren’t in place.
(iii) Still, they have the same cognitive significance (by standard 
tests) as those involved in the basic cases.
The theory accounts for the putative observation in (iii) by saying 
that the type has acquired a primary content which derives from the 
function which the tokens play in the basic cases and is inherited by 
the tokens in the non-basic cases.
The distinction between primary and secondary content is rel-
evant also to an issue Coliva and Belleri raise about transparency:
One further feature of the theory which is not entirely clear is the 
extent to which one’s singular thoughts are transparent. Recanati dis-
agrees with both Boghossian’s and Burge’s different takes on the is-
sue of the compatibility between externalism and self-knowledge. He 
claims that in the following kind of inference, taking place after a slow 
switch between worldly mental files and their counterparts on twin 
Earth,
Jo once loved playing in the water
Jo does not like playing in the water now
Jo has changed
it is not the case, contra Boghossian, that ‘water’ in (1) and (2) respec-
tively refer to water and twater; nor is it the case, contra Burge, that the 
reference of ‘water’ in (2) is water, like in (1), because the reasoning 
initiated in (1) requires the reference of ‘water’ to remain stable. Rath-
er, the reference of ‘water’ is confused in both cases, so it is neither 
water nor twater and therefore (1) and (2) are neither true nor false. 
Yet, according to Recanati, his account preserves transparency. (…)
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Even if one grants Recanati the idea of confused reference in (1) and 
(2), this would actually entail that while the subject may be thinking 
of thinking a (t)water-thought in each of the premises, he would not. 
So, it remains unclear how the proposed solution would actually allow 
to compatibilize externalism and the transparency of senses, for the 
content of one’s thoughts would still be unknown to the subject.
But the distinction between levels of content is crucial here. Refer-
ence is opaque, so secondary content is opaque as well. The subject 
does not know whether s/he is thinking about water, about twater, 
or about nothing at all. What the subject has transparent access to is 
the mode of presentation, not the reference. Now in (1) and (2) the 
same mode of presentation — the same mental file ‘water’ — occurs 
twice, so the subject knows that these two occurrences co-refer if 
they refer at all. There are three options compatible with what the 
speaker knows in virtue of the transparency of modes of presenta-
tion: (a) the two occurrences both refer to water; (b) they both refer 
to twater; (c) they both fail to refer because the file’s presupposi-
tion is violated in the slow-switch situation. Burge goes for option 
(a) (or option (b) if we reverse the order of the premises). I raise 
difficulties for his account, and advocate option (c), also compatible 
with the transparency of modes of presentation. This ensures (contra 
Boghossian) that a minimal degree of self-knowledge is compatible 
with externalism, but it has never been my intention to claim that 
externalism was compatible with a stronger, Cartesian form of self-
knowledge corresponding to the transparency of secondary content.
3 Are mental files indexical?
There was a time when people took indexicality to be a property of 
language, and of language exclusively. Thought itself, they believed, 
could not be indexical (any more than it could be ambiguous).2 Then 
came the discovery of ‘the essential indexical’. Castañeda, Prior, 
Geach, Perry, Lewis and others put forward examples in which 
removing the indexicals from a sentence changes the nature of the 
thought that is expressed. This seems to establish that the thought 
2 The reasoning behind that conclusion was fallacious – it begged the question 
against theories of thought that take the vehicle of representation to be constitu-
tive of thought (syntactic theories, as we might call them).
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expressed by uttering an indexical sentence is itself indexical, in 
some cases at least. Since then, the study of indexical thought has 
flourished. The nature of indexical thought has become a major topic 
in the philosophy of language and mind.
Has the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction? In his 
contribution to this symposium, Papineau suggests that it has:
There is a surprisingly widespread tendency to infer, from the use of 
indexical words to express some thought, that the thought expressed 
must be similarly indexically structured. But it does not take much re-
flection on cases to show that this inference is generally invalid. (Pap-
ineau, p. 8)
Papineau actually makes two claims against the ‘mental indexicality’ 
trend. One is that language and thought work differently — there 
is less indexicality in thought than language. The other claim is that 
the referential units in thought are ??????? ????? ????????? ????????????. 
Such mental files are more like names than like indexicals. Papineau 
rejects my appeal to fine-grained mental files based on specific con-
textual relations to objects, on the grounds that ‘personal-level con-
ceptual thought has no good use for [them]’ (p. 9). As we shall see, 
he thinks that as soon as we encounter an object we open a potentially 
lasting mental file for it, abstracting away from our current ER rela-
tions to it. Now there is a type of file with the required characteris-
tics in my system: ‘encyclopedia entries’ (as I call them) are lasting 
files, and they abstract from particular ER relations. Papineau likes 
them, but he does not think we need (in addition) the fine-grained 
files based on particular relations, such as demonstrative files.
Papineau makes a couple of sub-points pertaining to his first 
claim. First, he says that encyclopedia entries (which I treat as ab-
stractly indexical because they rest on contextual relations to objects 
without specifying/requiring any particular ER-relation) are not in-
dexical in the sense in which in language some words are indexical. 
He writes :
The only good way to fit the personal encyclopaedic Obama files into 
the standard indexical type-token structure would be to view them as 
tokens of the type encyclopaedic file (or perhaps encyclopaedic person 
file).  This type would have no reference of its own, and each of its 
tokens (such as an Obama file, or a my first teacher file, or a that-
woman-down-the-road file .  .  .) would then have its referent fixed as 
that thing (person) in the relevant thinker’s environment to which the 
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relevant file bears some epistemically rewarding relation.
This would work all right, but it would be strange, and certainly 
wouldn’t line up with any indexical constructions present in natu-
ral languages. We certainly don’t have some type word the tokens of 
which refer variously to Obama, my first teacher, that woman down 
the road, ... , depending on the context in which those tokens are ut-
tered. (Papineau, p. 3)
I admit that encyclopedic files are not indexical in the same sense in 
which demonstratives or the standard indexicals are. Whether or not 
we want to call them indexical is not a substantive issue (as Papineau 
notes). I call them indexical because the mode of reference deter-
mination is relational and corresponds to a feature of the type. The 
difference with standard indexical files in the narrow sense is that 
the relation is only specified abstractly.
Is Papineau right that this abstract form of indexicality does not 
line up with any indexical construction present in natural language ? 
I think that depends upon one’s semantic theory. I myself have put 
forward a semantic analysis of proper names which treat them as in-
dexical. (This is like Pelczar’s analysis, which Papineau mentions in 
a footnote.) As Fiengo and May 2006 rightly stressed, a proper name 
type — what Kaplan 1990 calls a generic name — does not refer, but 
has (typically multiple) bearers, in virtue of various naming-conven-
tions involving the name. What refers is a use of the name in a sen-
tence. What a use of the name refers to is some object x, assigned in 
context (in virtue of speaker’s intentions and related factors), provided 
the object in question satisfies the linguistic presupposition carried 
by the use of the name. What is is presupposed is that x, the referent, 
is a bearer of the name.3
Papineau, as you recall, objects that
We certainly don’t have some type word the tokens of which refer vari-
ously to Obama, my first teacher, that woman down the road, ..., de-
pending on the context in which those tokens are uttered. (Papineau, 
p. 3)
But proper names arguably are such words. To use a well-worn ex-
ample, the name ‘Aristotle’ is a type uses of which refer variously to 
3 If the presupposition fails, there may still be speaker’s reference but there is 
no semantic reference.
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the philosopher or to the shipping magnate. If proper names can be 
analysed as indexicals (and, in the footnote about Pelczar, Papineau 
acknowledges that they can), there is no reason why encyclopedia 
entries could not be.
In Direct Reference, I emphasized one potential consequence of the 
indexical view of names:
An ordinary indexical is associated with a particular relation R by the 
semantic conventions of the language. For every expression-type be-
longing to the category of ordinary indexicals, there is a specific rela-
tion R, such that the reference of a token of the expression is the object 
(or an object) which stands in that relation to the token. Different in-
dexicals are thus paired with different relations by the semantic rules 
of the language. But it seems that all proper names are associated with 
the same relation R by the semantic rules of the language: the reference 
of a proper name, in all cases, is the entity which bears that name. In 
other words, while there is a distinct semantic rule for each indexical 
(the rule that “I” refers to the speaker, “you” to the addressee, “this” to 
an entity contextually salient, and so forth), there is a single semantic 
rule for all proper names, namely the rule that a proper name refers to 
its bearer. (Recanati 1993 : 142)
Note that this is exactly like the case of encyclopedia entries as de-
scribed by Papineau. Different encyclopedia entries are tokens of the 
same abstract type ‘encyclopedia entry’. Similarly, in Direct Reference, 
I toyed with the idea that ‘there is a single abstract indexical, call it 
PN, corresponding to all proper names, or to the general category of 
proper names. Every proper name would be an instance of this ab-
stract indexical, which could thus be defined by the following rule: 
an instance of PN refers to the bearer of that instance’ (Recanati 
1993 : 142).
Papineau also mentions a couple of cases in which, even though 
an indexical word is used in expressing a thought, there is no cor-
responding indexical constituent in the thought. He uses ‘you’ as an 
example. When I see John and have a thought about him that I want 
to communicate to him, I say ‘you’. My thought — the thought I ex-
press — involves a lasting file about John. As Papineau says,
I don’t need to form an extra you file when I am about to address John, 
beyond any files about him I already have. So there is no reason to 
suppose that my utterance “You gave a good talk yesterday” expresses 
some corresponding indexical you thought.  Rather it is just the lin-
guistic means that I use to express a pre-existing non-second-person 
thought. (Papineau, p. 4)
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Of course, the use of the linguistic means in question (the word 
‘you’) to express a thought about John presupposes that John is iden-
tified as the current addressee. But according to Papineau,
The mental type in question operates mainly in the sub-personal speech 
production system.  Once this speech-production system ‘knows’ that 
John is the current addressee, it will set itself to express all John-refer-
ring thoughts using the word “you”.  In the normal case, I don’t need 
to think about how to express my thoughts. My selection of words is 
generated automatically, courtesy of an automatic and unconscious sys-
tem that figures out what grammatical string of words will best serve 
to express my thought in the current context. (Papineau, p. 5)
This raises a very interesting issue – are there indexical files in per-
sonal-level thought ? — which I am about to consider. For the time 
being, I simply note that Papineau’s observation about ‘you’ is com-
patible with my account. The case discussed by Papineau is (in my 
framework) a case in which the addressee is thought of under a com-
posite file resting on a number of ER relations to John, the person 
the speaker is addressing. This is not a pure ‘you’ file. (Assuming 
such files exist, they would be a variety of demonstrative files.)
I now turn to Papineau’s second claim, and his most significant 
objection to my account. Papineau thinks that as soon as we en-
counter an object we open a potentially lasting mental file about it, 
abstracting away from our current ER relations to that object. He 
does not think we need, in addition to such files (encyclopedia en-
tries), the fine-grained files based on particular ER relations, such 
as demonstrative files. He claims there are no such files: the demon-
strative component in thought corresponds to egocentric features of 
objects which are important because they guide action but which do 
not serve to accumulate information about the objects. To accumu-
late information, we need a potentially lasting file.
For Papineau there is a subpersonal system of action-guidance 
which, like the subpersonal system of speech production, needs in-
dexical categories; but thought is said to rest on a system of (endur-
ing) files which have the distinct function of accumulating informa-
tion about objects. It is a mistake to confuse the indexical categories 
at work in the action-guidance system and the referential categories 
(the files) we use in thought:
[The] automatic motor control system is not in the business of stor-
ing information about the things it refers to, and so will not have any 
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information-accumulating files associated with its tokens of that thing 
there. (Papineau, p. 8)
Papineau’s theory resembles a view put forward by Perry in vari-
ous places. Perry describes the mind has having both ‘buffers’ which 
register egocentric information about the objects which play certain 
important epistemic-pragmatic roles in the subject’s context (e.g. 
the role of current addressee), and ‘detached files’ about the objects 
in question. The buffers are arguably subpersonal, but this does not 
mean that we should only admit detached files as thought constitu-
ents, as Papineau suggests. In Direct Reference, after discussing Perry I 
offered a three-level picture with an intermediate category of indexi-
??????????????? between the buffers (bottom level) and the encyclope-
dia entries (top level).
One merit of having indexical files (in the narrow sense) as well 
as encyclopedia entries in thought is that this provides a bridge with 
the domain of perception, where reference goes through object files 
based on various tracking relations. The mechanism of incremental 
conversion makes it possible for indexical object-files to evolve into 
more and more abstract files, up to the encyclopedia entries which 
are ‘detached’ (in one sense at least). I think the transition between 
the two types of representation is an important issue, and that it 
must be explicitly represented in the theory. My system honours this 
requirement.
But Papineau is right to emphasize the dynamic unity of files 
across incremental conversion. In line with that emphasis, I my-
self introduced the (coarse-grained) ‘piles’ in addition to the (fine-
grained) files in chapter VII of Mental Files. A possibly better way 
of accommodating Papineau’s insights within my system would be 
to pair each file, qua body of information putatively about a single 
object, with a referential index. The index can play the role of ad-
dress or label for the file: at any given time t, the index will give 
access to the file currently bearing the index. But the innovation I 
am contemplating to make the system more dynamic is this : in in-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????. The index, thus construed, can do all the work done by 
the lasting file in Papineau’s framework. But the fine-grained files do 
not disappear, in contrast to what happens in Papineau’s framework. 
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The reason why we need them, and cannot do simply with coarse-
grained files à la Papineau, is that modes of presentation can be as 
fine-grained as one wishes.
Take Papineau’s example: I have a thought about John which I 
want to communicate to him, so I say ‘you’. As Papineau points out, 
my thought involves my John file – a lasting, composite file rather 
than a short-lived, demonstrative file. But if, suddenly, I come to 
entertain a doubt about the identity of the man in front of me, I may 
think: ‘Is that man really John? What about the moustache’? And I 
may ask him: ‘Are you John?’ in such cases I need to deploy fine-
grained files based on certain ER-relations and not others. I need a 
demonstrative file in addition to my preexisting John file. (In gen-
eral, I take it that one can modulate one’s files more or less at will, 
by giving prominence to certain epistemically rewarding relations 
and bracketing others. Dennett’s paper ‘Where Am I?’ provides nice 
examples of such modulation involving the ‘self’-file, in contexts in 
which the presupposition of unity of various informational channels 
fails.)
To account for the interrogative thought ‘Is that man really 
John?’, Papineau will need to appeal to two potentially lasting files : 
my John file, and the new file created for the man I see, who may or 
may not be John. The new file is ‘potentially lasting’ (like all files in 
Papineau’s framework), but it will actually last only if I keep using it; 
if the man I see turns out to be John I will discard the new file and 
not use it again, so it will decay and disappear. It will not last.
But I think it is not enough to posit two files to account for the 
case. We also need to account for the two types of mode of presenta-
tion at stake, corresponding to the singular terms ‘that man’ and 
‘John’ respectively. The first mode of presentation has to do with 
our current (perceptual) relation to the man, while the other one 
is based on multiple information sources. I take the first mode of 
presentation, expressed by ‘that man’, to be a demonstrative file, 
and the other one, expressed by ‘John’, to be an encyclopedia entry.
As we have seen, Papineau rejects the very idea of a demonstrative 
file. He acknowledges the existence of indexical modes of presenta-
tion in thought (at the interface with the action-guiding system), but 
thinks such modes of presentation are not in the business of stor-
ing information about the referents: the accumulation of informa-
François Recanati18
tion task is incumbent upon the lasting, coarse-grained files. That, 
I think, is the weak point in Papineau’s argument. In Mental Files I 
argued, contra Papineau,  that demonstrative files can themselves be 
used to accumulate information during the thought episode which is 
their lifespan (and within the bounds of which they can be re-used). 
Insofar as I can tell, there is no reason to restrict the function of stor-
ing information to lasting files.
4 Linking, merging, and coreference de jure
I take two terms to be coreferential de jure when they are associated 
with the same mental file. In identity judgements the terms flanking 
the identity sign are typically associated with distinct files. But we 
also need a notion of coreference de jure between pieces of informa-
tion, to capture the idea that sometimes — when the subject ‘trades 
upon identity’ (Campbell) — it is presupposed  that two pieces of 
information concern one and the same object. It would be natural 
to say that two pieces of information are coreferential de jure just in 
case they are ‘co-filed’ (to use Goodsell’s terminology), i.e. belong 
to the same mental file. Yet that is not possible in my framework. 
Corresponding to identity judgment, there is the operation on files 
I call ‘linking’. Linking two files makes the transfer of information 
possible between them. So, when you discover that A is B, you are 
licensed to transfer information in the a file into the b file, and vice 
versa. But that means that the files will now contain information 
gathered ‘from outside’, i.e., not through the ER-relation on which 
the file is based but through linking. I thus distinguish the ‘nucleus’ 
and the  ‘periphery’ of the file. Only bits of information in the nu-
cleus will be coreferential de jure. (Information in the periphery is 
only there because of a judgement of identity.) In other words : in my 
framework co-filing does not require presumptions of identity with 
presuppositional status. Defeasible identity judgments are sufficient 
to ground co-filing. It follows that co-filing is a weaker notion than 
coreference de jure between pieces of information: not all pieces of 
information that are co-filed are coreferential de jure.
Goodsell objects that the resulting theory is incoherent:
Recanati explicitly claims that it is not the case that if i and j are in the 
same mental file, then i and j are de jure coreferential (94-95). This 
19Mental Files: Replies to my Critics
claim… seems inconsistent with files playing the mode of presentation 
role. (Goodsell, p. 7)
Indeed modes of presentation determine reference, and they account 
for cognitive significance. Because modes of presentation play that 
these two roles, Goodsell argues, it is a priori that two occurrences 
of the same mode of presentation will corefer if they refer at all. So if 
two pieces of information are associated with the same mode of pre-
sentation (the same file), it will be presupposed that they concern the 
same object (if any). Thus it seems impossible to separate co-filing 
and coreference de jure.
I agree with Goodsell that there is a potential problem here. For-
tunately, as she points out, another option is available. Moreover, it 
is an option which I think we need to consider if, following Pryor’s 
interesting suggestions for developing the mental-file account, we 
opt for a graph-theoretic representation of relations (Pryor, forth-
coming).
The idea I am now toying with is that linking should not be de-
scribed as allowing ‘information transfer’ between files. Suppose we 
start with two files, a and b, and the identity of their referents is dis-
covered (or is thought to have been discovered). Linking takes place, 
corresponding to the identity judgement ‘A = B’. Linking enables 
information in one file to ‘mix’ with information in the other file in 
reasoning ; but no transfer of information between files has to occur, 
strictly speaking. Linking does no more or no less than an identity 
judgment does.
Interestingly, Goodsell points out that
It is possible that though i and j were initially treated as about the same 
thing in virtue of an identity judgement, that identity judgement be-
comes so embedded in the thinker’s reasoning that she becomes dis-
posed to reason as if i and j are about the same thing without deploying 
an additional identity premise in her reasoning. (p. 8)
I think this is correct: an identity may acquire presuppositional sta-
tus with time. The more we use the files a and b in tandem in reason-
ing (because of the identity belief which enables information in them 
to mix), the more we tend to presuppose the identity which grounds 
the coordinated use of the two files. At some point in the process 
identity will be presupposed. This point is often represented through 
the ‘merging’ idea: instead of two files, we only have one. A slightly 
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different representation is made possible by the idea of referential 
index I introduced in my response to Papineau. When identity be-
tween A and B is presupposed, the two files come to share the same 
referential index. That means that the two files are now treated as a 
single, composite file (in virtue of the principle that two distinct files 
cannot bear the same referential index at the same time).
Goodsell points out that, before the presupposition stage, when 
the two files are merely linked,
I retain my ability to think independently about that-heared bird and 
that-seen bird, that is, it remains possible that [they are] different birds.
This is right, but I would go further. Even when the identity is pre-
supposed I may retain that ability. If I discover that the identity is 
mistaken and that there are actually two birds (one I see and one 
I hear), I can deconstruct the composite file and restore the initial 
indices. When, as in this case, the files correspond to distinct infor-
mation channels (here, distinct modalities), un-merging the files is a 
relatively simple matter of index-splitting.
This relates to an issue I discussed in my response to Papineau. 
We can modulate our files in response to incoming information, e.g. 
we can stop using a composite file and start using two more spe-
cific files instead. As Goodsell points out in a footnote, ‘to suppose 
that i and j are about different things, the thinker must move i and 
j to distinct files’ (Goodsell, p. 7n). The distribution of referential 
indices tracks the current presuppositional state of the thinker, but 
that state dynamically evolves. Presuppositions come in and go out 
of existence all the time.
5 Mental files vs. competing accounts
In Mental Files, I discuss alternative frameworks such as two dimen-
sional neo-Descriptivism, token-reflexivism, and Lewis’s centered-
content framework. Lawlor argues that I am too critical of these 
frameworks, and that both the token-reflexive framework and the 
descriptivist framework have the resources to address my worries 
in a potentially satisfactory manner. In a syncretic spirit, she claims 
that ‘one does not need to argue for the absolute untenability of oth-
er approaches in order to advocate in favor of the files framework’ 
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(Lawlor, p. 11). Likewise, Garcia-Carpintero attempts to defend a 
view similar to Perry’s (involving a distinction between the singular 
content of a state and its primary content, understood as a token-
reflexive proposition), and suggests that it is compatible with my ap-
proach in terms of files, though not with the Lewisian approach I 
advocate in Perspectival Thought and my papers on IEM. (On the last 
point, see the next section.)
But I do not think I ever argued for the absolute untenability of the 
other approaches. On the contrary, I hold that all the main approach-
es shed some light on the phenomenon, and that each improves as a 
result of elaboration made necessary by criticism emanating from the 
other approaches (including, hopefully, criticism presented in Mental 
Files). I believe that, in the end, there is a true convergence, which I 
tried to highlight in the last chapter of the book.
Lawlor speaks as if my mental files account stood in contrast to 
Perry’s account, but it doesn’t; it’s an elaboration of it. Perry distin-
guishes between the content (a singular proposition) and the belief 
state, and assigns the state a primary content akin to a kaplanian 
character. Belief states are vehicles, in my terminology, and Perry 
himself appeals to files qua mental particulars in analysing them. My 
theory has exactly the same ingredients as his. Note that, in Perry’s 
work, you find elements from different frameworks: a two-dimen-
sional component, a mental-particular component, a token-reflexive 
component (not to mention the Lewisian component which surfaces 
in ‘Thought without Representation’).
Even though Garcia-Carpintero thinks my mental files account 
is in tension with the Lewisian approach of Perspectival Thought, he 
acknowledges that elements from different frameworks can be com-
bined. Thus he takes Stalnakerian diagonal propositions, or token-
reflexive propositions of the sort he himself advocates, to be less an 
alternative to Perry’s initial theory of indexical belief than an elabo-
ration:
Perry accepts that, for the kind of consideration about informational 
content that Stalnaker pointed out, (…) token-reflexive contents pro-
vide a better representation of the significance of belief-states than the 
one he had earlier suggested in terms of Kaplanian characters. (…) On 
this interpretation, the proposal is just a refined way of understanding 
the significance of belief-states; but an adequate account of de se con-
tents (hence of the nature of attitudes and speech acts in general) still 
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requires the distinction between belief-contents and belief-states (ways 
of accessing the content). The modification of Perry’s original proposal 
lies only in that now the significance of belief-states is characterized in 
the traditional propositional way that token-reflexive contents afford. 
(Garcia-Carpintero, p. 5)
Similarly, Stalnaker points out, Lewis’s centred contents can be used 
to model the primary content of belief states in Perry’s framework 
(Stalnaker 2003 : 255n).
Let me say a bit more about the convergence I talked about. The 
most important thing is that everybody agrees that we need two 
levels of content. The distinction can be captured in different ways 
(character/content; diagonal/horizontal; reflexive content/subject 
matter content, etc.), but it is unescapable. The only (apparent) ex-
ception is Lewis: he seems to have a single level of content — cen-
tred contents. But this is an illusion (Recanati 2012b : 249). Lewis’s 
centred contents are relativized propositions, and relativized propo-
sitions can only be evaluated against an appropriate index. If you pair 
the index and the centred content, you get an Austinian proposition 
with classical truth-conditions. Suppose the indexical content of a 
belief state is a property P which the believer self-ascribes. Then the 
belief is true iff the believer has P. The right-hand side of the bicondi-
tional gives us the secondary content of the belief, while the prop-
erty P itself corresponds to its primary content. So, as I emphasized 
in Perspectival Thought, there are two levels of content in the centred 
content framework.
The main problem with Relational Descriptivism (i.e. the version 
of Descriptivism which takes on board causal/relational factors and 
rephrases the descriptive contents in terms of them) is that it puts the 
acquaintance relations into the content of the belief even though they 
clearly don’t belong to its subject matter. But if we add to Relational 
Descriptivism a distinction between two levels of content — as 2-D 
Relational Descriptism does — the objection no longer arises. The 
acquaintance relations are now represented as part of primary con-
tent, not as part of secondary or subject-matter content.
In Mental Files, I objected to all ‘internalization’ of acquaintance 
relations, on grounds of intellectualism. Acquaintance relations are 
determinative of content, but they are not themselves represented. 
This must be qualified, to take account of the distinction between 
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primary and secondary content. Acquaintance relations are not (ex-
plicitly) represented as part of secondary content, but that is com-
patible with their being, perhaps, implicitly represented as part of 
primary content. As Lawlor points out, ‘unreflective people reason 
in ways that are sensitive to the mode by which they acquire in-
formation’ (p. 7); that sensitivity is not the same thing as having ‘a 
higher-order thought about the sources of one’s information’ (id.). I 
agree. I also agree that distinguishing between unreflective sensitiv-
ity to ER-relations and explicit representation of them makes it pos-
sible for 2-D Relational Descriptivism to evade the charge of intel-
lectualism, while still somehow incorporating the ER relations into 
primary content. But that means that, just as there are two levels of 
content in that framework, there are two distinct ‘grasping’ relations 
corresponding to them. The secondary content is what the thinker 
(explicitly) represents, but the primary content is not represented in 
the same way. The thinker stands in a different relation to primary 
content than the relation he or she stands in to secondary content. 
Modulo this distinction between two grasping relations, 2-D Rela-
tional Descriptivism can be saved.
But if that is so, then, Lawlor argues, ‘it seems we do not need 
a file framework to dispense with the relevant Descriptivist com-
mitment. So what recommends a files-based approach?’ (p. 9) As I 
pointed out already, the mental-file account I offer seeks to integrate 
as much as possible of the insights underlying the other accounts ; 
but, of course, it adds something to them. Why add something ? Be-
cause it’s not enough to posit two levels of content, even if you add 
a corresponding distinction between two grasping relations, one ap-
propriate to secondary content and the other one to primary con-
tent. You must say something about ???????????????????? in the case of 
primary content.
Perry, one of the few authors who’ve touched upon this issue, 
calls that relation ‘attunement’. He describes it as follows:
Attunement to the relation that our self-notions have to ourselves, or 
our perceptions have to the object they are of, does not require belief 
or thought about the relation; it requires know-how, not knowledge 
that. (Perry 2012 : 99)
This is very much the Lawlor point about unreflective sensitivity vs 
explicit representation, but Perry more specifically talks of ‘know 
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how’. What that means, according to the gloss I offer in Mental  Files, 
is that primary contents (which Perry initially modeled as Kaplanian 
characters)
have a procedural nature. They correspond to certain functions which 
words or mental vehicles have. The functions in question are not rep-
resented. The vehicles simply have those functions and they operate in 
context according to these functions. The referential content of the 
vehicle depends upon that operation (Recanati 2012b : 248)
On this view, primary content must be cashed out in terms of func-
tions or roles. The functions are not represented or thought about by 
the users, yet (as Lawlor points out) they are transparent to them in 
the sense that they ‘know how’ to operate according to them. Now, 
there is no function or role unless it is the function/role of something. 
That something is the vehicle. The mental file account completes 
the story by adding the vehicles and interpreting primary content in 
terms of their functional roles.
In the last chapter of Mental Files, I offer a critical assessment of 
token-reflexivism, which Lawlor finds too harsh. But she misinter-
prets me. My goal is not to argue against token-reflexivism, but to 
show where it leads. I argue that, if you embrace token-reflexivism 
and try to meet the objections it raises as they come up, you end up 
with something like the theory of mental files. The argument pro-
ceeds in three steps. I show first that token-reflexivism, properly 
understood, reduces to a view very similar to Lewis’s. Then I show 
that this view (Lewisian token-reflexivism, as we may call it) itself 
raises objections — the same which Lewis’s original framework 
raises — but that these objections can be met by shifting to a multi-
centred variant. Finally I show that (suitably elaborated in order to 
meet a new set of objections) the multi-centred variant leads us to 
the theory of mental files.
As we have seen already, Garcia-Carpintero holds that token-
reflexive propositions can usefully replace the kaplanian characters 
which Perry initially appealed to to model the primary content of 
doxastic vehicles.4 Garcia-Carpintero defend a version of the Perry 
4 Garcia-Carpintero, following Stalnaker, argues that token-reflexive propo-
sitions are better suited than characters or centered contents to explain com-
munication.
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view on which the doxastic vehicle has both a referential content 
(a singular proposition) and a reflexive content which captures the 
significance of the state (its primary content). In this framework, 
the mode of presentation under which the object a singular belief is 
about is thought of can be rendered by a token-reflexive description. 
So if I think ‘I am tired’, the primary content of my thought occur-
rence (call it u) is the token-reflexive proposition that the thinker of 
u is tired at the time of u (in the world of u). Similar views have been 
argued for by John Searle, James Higginbotham, and John Perry.
This view raises a prima facie problem. Under which mode of 
presentation is the occurrence itself, u, thought about when we 
think the thought ? The mode of presentation of u can’t be a token-
reflexive description, on pains of circularity. The solution consists 
in arguing that u itself is not ‘thought about’ in the way the objects 
in the subject-matter content are thought about. Ordinary objects 
are thought of under modes of presentation which (according to the 
view) can be cashed out in token-reflexive terms; but the mental oc-
currences which feature in the token-reflexive descriptions (‘thinker 
of u’, ‘time of u’, etc.) are not themselves thought of under modes of 
presentation. They are directly given, in the flesh. This is the old 
Russellian idea of (strong) acquaintance or ‘super-direct reference’ 
(as I call it in the book), an idea which Perry endorses. Now this 
idea can be elegantly expressed in a variant of Lewis’s framework, 
by centering the content on the mental occurrence of which it is the 
content:
This idea can be couched in Lewis’s framework, by externalizing the 
occurrence u and letting it be directly provided by the context. Ev-
erything is then described relative to u, but u itself is given, it is not 
represented. On this mixture of the two frameworks (centered worlds 
and reflexivism), the content of a mental occurrence is a property of 
occurrences, and that content is evaluated with respect to a contextual 
index containing the occurrence itself. On this Lewis-inspired view, 
to judge something by assertively tokening a certain representation is 
to ascribe to the token the property that is its content. Here reflexivity 
is guaranteed by the pragmatic architecture of the act of judgment. So 
when you think ‘I am tired’, the content of the thought is the property 
an occurrence has just in case the thinker of that occurrence is tired 
at the time of the occurrence in the world of the occurrence. To think 
the thought (or to think it assertively) is to ascribe that property to the 
current occurrence u you are producing. (Recanati 2012b : 253)
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However, both Lewis’s original theory and the token-reflexive vari-
ant I have just presented raise the ‘Cartesian Asymmetry’ objection:
the main problem (…) is the asymmetry between different objects of 
thought. Everything is thought of descriptively, except for a single ele-
ment which is externalized and serves as universal anchor for all the con-
tent. Although I have no knock down argument against this approach, 
I find it unsufficiently motivated and too much in the grip of a rather 
extreme Cartesian picture. Why not appeal instead to multiple anchors, 
corresponding to all the acquaintance relations in which we stand to 
objects of thought? (Recanati 2012b : 253)
On the mental file picture, there is no asymmetry. Singular thoughts 
are about objects that are all represented under nondescriptive 
modes of presentation based on acquaintance relations. There is no 
privileged subset of objects (the subject-at-a-time, or his/her mental 
occurrences) which can be thought of ‘super-directly’ and in terms 
of which all the other objects are described.
Among the Lewisians, some have tried to get rid of the Cartesian 
asymmetry by substituting multi-centred worlds for Lewis’s centred 
worlds. All the objects of thought can be externalized and fed into 
the index of evaluation, in a multi-centred framework. I have much 
sympathy for this framework, but in the book I introduce a friendly 
amendment : instead of including a sequence of objects (Ninan’s ‘res-
sequence’) in the ‘base world’ serving as index of evaluation, I pro-
pose to include a sequence of files. This makes it possible to account 
for Frege cases and empty cases.5 (The objects themselves can be 
easily be retrieved: the objects of thought are the referents of the files 
in the base world, i.e. those objects which, as a matter of contingent 
fact, stand in the right relations to the files.) This is a ‘Lewisian’ ver-
sion of the mental file framework. The main insight behind token-
reflexivism is not lost, however. What fixes the reference of our files 
are certain relations between the files (tokens) and objects in the 
external environment, relations to which thinkers are ‘attuned’ and 
which are presupposed when the files are deployed.
Coliva and Belleri worry that my friendly amendment to the 
multi-centred world framework may be too drastic:
5 Ninan himself introduces acquaintance relations, in additions to the objects 
in the res-sequence, to account for Frege cases. But to deal with the empty case 
and other cases in which there is no acquaintance, you need the files.
27Mental Files: Replies to my Critics
Sequences of individuals are expunged from centred worlds, and only 
mental files are kept (256, 258). If this is so, then the files seem to 
acquire a strange status. On the one hand, they are mental, ‘internal’ 
objects, which act as vehicles of thought or ‘mental singular terms’ 
(viii, 35, 182, 244-5); on the other hand, they are the ‘anchors’ of our 
de re thoughts (253). These two features, however, seem difficult to 
reconcile: for one would think that the objects of our de re thoughts are 
external to the mind, and that they do not coincide with the vehicles 
we use to refer to things in the world. Recanati could reply that the 
proper objects of our de re thoughts are really the referents of the men-
tal files at issue—not the files themselves. This, however, just suggests 
that mental files alone are not enough in order to capture de re thought: 
individuals matter as well, and they should find their place in a suitable 
semantics for this kind of phenomenon. (Coliva and Belleri, pp. 5-6)
Of course, individuals matter, since individuals are what singular 
thoughts are about. But real individuals only feature in the thought’s 
secondary content. The thought’s secondary content depends upon the 
environment. In the world in which the subject thinks the thought 
(the base world) the subject’s files are suitably related to individu-
als who, in virtue of these relations, count as the referents of the 
files. These referents feature in the thought’s secondary content, and 
have a place in the semantics. So singularity and world-involvingness 
are not lost, in that framework. But if we are concerned with the 
thought’s primary content, we can capture it without bringing real 
individuals into the picture. The thought’s primary content is a prop-
erty of a sequence of objects, representable as a set of multi-centred 
worlds. These worlds are the subject’s doxastic alternatives. In each 
of the subject’s doxastic alternatives, there will be a sequence of ob-
jects (possibly different objects in different worlds) corresponding to 
the mental files tokened in the base-world. Which objects the sub-
ject’s thought actually is about will be determined by objective fea-
tures of the base-world: they will be the objects which the files refer 
to in that world (in virtue of the ER-relations holding at that world). 
So : Mental files are, indeed, not sufficient to capture (the secondary 
content of) de re thought: the world has to play its part. But they are 
sufficient to capture the thought’s primary content.
François Recanati28
6 IEM and the de se
Garcia-Carpintero detects a tension between my ‘Lewisian’ account 
of de se content in Perspectival Thought and the theory of mental files. 
He takes the latter to be compatible with his own token-reflexive 
approach, which uses only classical propositions (both at the primary 
and the secondary level). I agree that they are compatible, but I don’t 
think the token-reflexive view has to be seen as competing with the 
centred-content approach. As I pointed out in section 5, the token-
reflexive view can  be formulated in Lewis’s framework, by centering 
the contents on the occurrences of which they are the content.
In Perspectival Thought I presented my own take on the primary/
secondary distinction. I distinguished two levels. The first one is 
that of ‘explicit’ content. I call that primary content the lekton. The 
lekton is a centred content (a ‘relativized proposition’): it can only 
be evaluated as true or false against an appropriate circumstance of 
evaluation involving not only a possible world, but also an additional 
component corresponding to that on which the content is ‘centred’: 
the subject at a time in Lewis’s original framework, the occurrence 
in Lewisian token-reflexivism, the topic situation in situation seman-
tics, or whatever. That component is not explicitly represented in 
the lekton because it is contextually given or taken for granted. Thus 
the perception-based thought ‘it is raining’ has a content that is a 
property of situations (the property a situation has just in case it is 
raining in that situation). The situation the thought is about is not 
explicitly represented (as it would be if the thought were ‘it is raining 
here’), but it is determined as the relevant situation of evaluation by 
the perceptual nature of the experience which grounds the thought : 
perception is perception of the local situation, so the judgment ‘it is 
raining’, based on perception, is bound to concern the local situation 
(even though the latter is not explicitly represented in the content). 
The judgment is true iff it is raining in that local situation. The truth-
conditions in the right-hand-side of the biconditional correspond 
to the secondary content of the thought. The secondary content is 
classical (uncentered) and results from the interaction of the explicit 
content, which is centred, and the relevant circumstance of evalua-
tion. (This interaction is what the notion of ‘Austinian proposition’ 
is meant to capture.)
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The central insight here comes from Perry’s ‘Thought without 
Representation’, where he argues that sometimes, ‘architectural 
or external constraints make internal representation unnecessary’ 
(Perry 1993 : 221). I use that feature to account for immunity to er-
ror through misidentification. When you detect the position of your 
legs through proprioception, the fact that it is your legs whose posi-
tion is represented in the content of the proprioceptive experience 
transparently follows from the fact that the experience is proprio-
ceptive. Proprioceptive experience is bound to concern the experi-
encer’s own body. Still, the content of the experience does not have 
to represent the subject whose body is in question ; it does not have 
to identify the subject whose bodily condition is represented. It is 
the (proprioceptive) mode of the experience which determines that 
its content (a bodily property) concerns the subject who is having 
the experience, and not some other subject. There is, as Perry puts 
it, an ‘architectural constraint’ that the body which a propriocep-
tive experience concerns is the subject’s own body. In virtue of that 
constraint, the issue of whose legs are crossed simply does not arise. 
Misidentification is impossible because there is no identification in 
the first place.
To be sure, the proprioceptive experience is veridical iff the sub-
ject’s legs are crossed. This corresponds to the secondary content of 
the state – its truth-conditions. But the subject is an ‘unarticulated’ 
constituent of that secondary content. It is unarticulated because it 
is not explicitly represented in the primary content of the state, but 
contributed by the proprioceptive mode (through the circumstancial 
component it determines).
Garcia-Carpintero contrasts this account with the so-called 
‘Simple Account’, according to which immunity to error through 
misidentification is a negative property: there is IEM whenever the 
first person judgment ‘I am F’ does not include, among its epistemic 
grounds, an identity premise ‘I = a’ (where ‘a’ refers to an individual 
independently thought to be F). He says that I offer my account ‘in-
stead of’ the Simple Account,6 and adjudicates in favor of the latter. 
6 ‘The explanation that the Simple Account affords appeals to the absence of 
an identity claim in the justificational structure; Recanati’s explanation appeals 
instead to the absence of a conception of the self in the content of the IEM judg-
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But these accounts do not compete. My account explains ???, in pro-
prioceptive cases and other cases like it, there is no need for an iden-
tity premise in the grounds: it is the mode of the experience which 
determines what it’s about (or more precisely : what it ‘concerns’).7
Following other authors, Garcia-Carpintero distinguishes two 
senses of ‘identification’: ‘identification
C
’ means that the subject is 
explicitly represented in the content of the judgment; ‘identifica-
tion
P
’ means that there is an identity premise ‘I = a’ in the judge-
ment’s grounds. He rightly points out that there can be identifica-
tion
C
 without identification
P
, and that in such cases the judgment is 
still IEM. (I will discuss these cases in a minute.) But I don’t think 
this supports the Simple Account as opposed to mine. What my ac-
count says is simply this:  sometimes, there is no identification
C
 of the 
subject in the lekton because an ‘architectural’ mechanism ensures 
that the content of the state is about the subject’s own body. Using 
Searle’s mode/content distinction: in the relevant cases it is the mode 
of the experience, not its content, which is responsible for its first 
personal character, by fixing the self as the relevant point of evalua-
tion for the content. Since, in such cases, the mode dictates that the 
content can only be self-ascribed, no identity premise (no identifi-
cation
P
) is needed to ground the first person judgment. There is no 
sense in which I can think ‘Someone is F, but it is me?’, because the 
mode of the experience which grounds the judgment precludes the 
possibility that it might not be me. This is entirely compatible with 
the Simple Account. Again, I explain ???, in the relevant cases, no 
identity premise is involved.
Garcia-Carpintero cites two objections which have been made to 
my account. The first is that there can be IEM even if the subject is ex-
plicitly represented in the content of the judgment. This corresponds 
to the cases in which there is identification
C
 without identification
P
. 
As Garcia-Carpintero points out, I acknowledge their existence, and 
I account for them by appealing to the process of ‘reflection’ through 
ments’ (Garcia-Carpintero, p. 8).
7 See Wright 2012, p. 273: ‘Recanati’s core proposal is, in a way, perfectly 
consistent with the Simple Account. (…) [It] can be viewed as… an attempt to 
characterize the distinctive justificational architecture of those I-thoughts that 
are IEM in a fashion that does indeed explain why the Simple Account applies’.
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which an element of secondary content implicitly contributed by the 
mode is made explicit and gets represented in the primary content of 
the reflective judgment (Recanati 2012a). Reflection is, for example, 
the transition from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining here’. This transi-
tion never involves adding anything to the grounds of the original 
judgment. If I am justified in believing, on the basis of my percep-
tion, ‘it is raining’, then I am justified in believing, on the same ba-
sis, ‘it is raining here’. Because the grounds of the post-reflection 
judgment are the same as the grounds of the original judgment, if 
the latter is IEM by the simple account, i.e. lacks an identity premise 
among its grounds, then the former is bound to be IEM too. So I have 
no trouble with cases of identification
C
 without identification
P
.
The other objection is this. Immunity to error through misiden-
tification also affects judgments that are not in the first person. A 
demonstrative judgment ‘That is F’ can be (and typically is) IEM, 
by the lights of most authors who write about the topic. But my ac-
count, according to Garcia-Carpintero (following Wright), fails to 
extend to demonstrative IEM. Now, I don’t agree that it fails, though 
I agree that some work has to be done to implement my proposal in 
the demonstrative case. But even if my account failed to extend to 
demonstrative IEM, that would not necessarily be a problem since 
the Simple Account takes IEM to be a negative property. As Wright 
himself suggested, different mechanisms can be at work in the first 
person case and in the demonstrative case; the explanation of why 
an identity premise is not required may be different in the two cases 
(Wright 2012 : 274).
I now turn to the tension which Garcia-Carpintero detects be-
tween my Lewisian account of IEM and the mental file framework. 
Mental files are singular terms in the language of thought, so if first 
person thoughts are thoughts involving the Self file, then their con-
tent is not Lewisian : it is not selfless. I quote Garcia-Carpintero:
Simply put, mental files are individual concepts, and concepts are in-
gredients of contents. If the account of de se thoughts is that they deploy 
the Self mental file, then the contents of de se thoughts have this con-
cept as an ingredient. (…) In the terminology used above, Recanati’s 
account of de se thoughts and their communication appears to involve 
an identification
C
 – the Self file. (Garcia-Carpintero, p. 10)
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This is a good objection, and I am happy of the opportunity it pro-
vides to clarify my views on this topic (the relations between the 
mental file account and the Lewisian account in Perspectival Thought).
Garcia-Carpintero notes that, in addition to files (which are con-
ceptual and satisfy the Generality Constraint), I also posit ‘proto-
files’ which are nonconceptual. Thus there is a proto-file Self*, 
which can only host information gained in the first person way (while 
the Self file can host any information one gains about oneself). But 
this does not neatly correlate with the distinction between ‘explicit’ 
de se thoughts, in which the self is represented, and ‘implicit’ de se 
thoughts whose content is selfless. It’s ok to say that explicit de se 
thoughts involve the Self file, but what about implicit de se thoughts? 
Carpintero hypothesises that ‘it is the Self* proto-file that figures in 
basic, “implicit” de se contents’, but objects that ‘contentful states in-
volving the Self* proto-file still appear to involve an identification
C
’ 
(p. 10). Indeed, if the Self* proto-file contributes to the primary 
content of first person experience at the nonconceptual level, then 
the primary content in question is not selfless. Hence Garcia-Carpin-
tero’s doubts regarding ‘the compatibility of [my] Lewisian account 
of de se contents and the mental files approach’ (p. 1).
Yet, I maintain, they are compatible. My Lewisian account is an 
account of the (selfless) content of first person experience. Based on 
the experience, there is a first person thought involving the Self file. 
That thought is explicitly first personal. It involves identification
C
 but 
no identification
P
 because, through ‘reflection’, the thought inherits 
the grounds of the underlying experience.
What about the proto-file ? In virtue of its mode, the experience 
feeds its selfless content into the Self* proto-file, but I do not regard 
the proto-file as an aspect of the experience itself. The experience I 
analyse into (selfless) content and mode. Nor is the self* proto-file 
used in thought ; rather, it is used in the guidance of action. So I 
maintain that the Lewisian account applies to first person experi-
ence, while the mental file account applies to reflective thought in 
which the self is explicitly represented. The transition from first per-
son experience to explicit first person thought is only possible if the 
subject possesses a first-person concept, i.e. a Self file.
In closing, let me address another worry, voiced by Coliva and 
Belleri, regarding my account of IEM:
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The identity between oneself and the person whose body is respon-
sible for the proprioceptive/self-locating information one is receiving, 
or between oneself and the person whose memories one is storing, is 
only contingent. But if our SELF file should guarantee knowledge of its 
referent in all possible circumstances, for otherwise it would no longer 
be a SELF file, it cannot be based on those epistemically rewarding 
relations. For, in some circumstances, they would not deliver infor-
mation about oneself… Hence, we need a relation which secures the 
knowledgeable identity of the subject to himself in all possible circum-
stances. That relation, we take it, would rather be the one between the 
subject and the thinker of a given occurrent thought. What this shows 
is that not all singular modes of presentation of a given entity, in this 
case the subject himself, are on a par with respect to a given file. Some 
would seem to be constitutive of it, like ‘the thinker of this occurrent 
thought’ for SELF. (Coliva and Belleri, p. 4)
But the reference of a file is not the object one is gaining information 
from through the relevant information channel. In the deviant cases 
Coliva and Belleri allude to (quasi-memory, quasi-perception, quasi-
proprioception, etc.), the information channel delivers information 
whose (deviant) source turns out to be another individual. But ????????
still refers to the subject under those circumstances: the subject still refers 
to himself or herself by deploying the Self file. The file refers to the 
object one stands in the right ER-relation to, and in the case of the 
Self file, that relation is identity.
The information channels correspond to ways of gaining infor-
mation about an object x that are normally available to the subject 
when, and only when, s/he stands in the right relation to x. The 
relation is said to be ‘epistemically rewarding’ because, when that 
relation holds, one is in a position to gain information about x in a 
special way, e.g. (in the first person case) ‘from inside’.8 That special 
information channel normally delivers information about the object 
x one stands in the corresponding ER relation to, but in the deviant 
cases it does not: in quasi-proprioception, for example, information 
gained from inside (through proprioception) has its source in anoth-
8 The ER relation, in the first person case, is not the relation of ‘gaining in-
formation about x from inside’. The ER relation is identity. The ER relation is 
one thing, and the information channel corresponding to it is another. Normally, 
they go together: one can gain information about x from inside just in case one 
is x. Yet the ‘internal’ information channel can fail to deliver information about 
oneself, while the Self file, based upon the ER relation (identity), can’t fail to 
refer to oneself.
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er individual than the individual we are. Still, the Self file refers to 
oneself, even in these circumstances, because it refers to the object 
one stands in the right relation to – not to the object we are gaining 
information from.
Be that as it may, Coliva’s and Belleri’s search for a relation that 
guarantees self-knowledge in all possible circumstances sounds sus-
piciously Cartesian and seems to fall prey to Wright’s objection:
Those of my thoughts that are immune to error through misidentifica-
tion are not so because they involve super-sure identification of myself, 
conceived on the model of knowledge of an identity ‘I am a’ [e.g : I am 
the thinker of this thought -- FR], but because no such judgment… 
features in their justificational architecture. (Wright 2012 : 253)
This — the Simple Account — applies to all IEM thoughts. Now 
there is an important distinction (emphasized by Coliva in her work) 
between logical IEM and contingent or de facto IEM. The mechanism 
I posit to explain IEM is meant to account for contingent first person 
IEM. I have tried to extend it to another kind of contingent IEM, 
namely demonstrative IEM — without being able to convince either 
Wright or Garcia-Carpintero that this is the right way to go. I suspect 
that the underlying mechanism is different in the case of logical IEM, 
a property exhibited by self-ascription of one’s occurrent thoughts. 
Given that (i) the Self file refers to the subject in whose thought the 
file is deployed, and (ii) the subject is ‘attuned’ to that fact, it would 
be incoherent for a reflective subject to deny ownership of his or her 
own occurrent thoughts. In this case, perhaps, Garcia-Carpintero’s 
analysis of IEM applies.9
François Recanati
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